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African soldiers in the Netherlands East Indies
colonial empire. The example of the black regi-
ments in the British West Indies inspired govern-
ment officials in The Hague to look first of all at
the possibilities of recruiting blacks in the New
World. A report submitted to the Department of
War with the portentous title ‘Thoughts on an
inexpensive and efficient organization of the
army in the Netherlands East Indies’ proposed to
recruit liberated Negroes and runaway slaves in
the United States.1 But the Department of
Colonies objected: American Negroes were likely
to cause problems, as they would be infused with
ideals of equality, which thus far had been
frustrated in the United States. And if the US
government itself at some point were to acquire
colonial ambitions, the loyalty of American
troops in the East Indies could not be taken for
granted. The Department of Colonies preferred to
recruit ‘children of nature’, unspoilt blacks who
would willingly submit to European guidance.2
These children of nature, it was believed in The
Hague, were to be found in Africa.
Thus, the Department of Colonies turned to
the almost forgotten Dutch Possessions on the
Guinea Coast, where commercial activity was at a
low ebb following the abolition of the slave trade
in 1814. These neglected outposts now had the
opportunity to make themselves useful in the
eyes of the Dutch government by supplying
manpower to the army. It was assumed that
Africans would be better equipped to withstand
the hot climate and dreaded tropical diseases in
the East Indies. The Negro race was deemed to be
very strong and used to a tough life under harsh
conditions: ‘where whole populations become
extinct, the Negroes will remain’.3 Most European
soldiers in the tropics succumbed to diseases,





Between 1831 and 1872 some 3,000 African
recruits sailed from Elmina to Batavia (now
Jakarta), the capital of the Netherlands East
Indies. They had been recruited to serve in the
Dutch colonial army, which throughout most of
the 19th century experienced a chronic shortage
of European manpower. The Africans counted as
part of the European contingent of the army and
were to be treated as Europeans. After expiry of
their contracts, some returned to the Gold Coast.
The majority settled in Elmina, where the Dutch
governor allocated plots for the veterans on a hill
behind St George’s Castle, which today is still
known as Java Hill. Their army pensions were
paid out in the castle. Others, having established
families during their long years of army service,
opted to settle in the East Indies. They became
the founding fathers of the Indo-African commu-
nities in the Javanese towns of Purworedjo,
Semarang, Salatiga and Solo. On Java, the African
soldiers and their descendants became known as
‘Belanda Hitam’ – Black Dutchmen. An army
career became a family tradition, for many sons
and grandsons of the African soldiers also served
in the Dutch army. After Indonesia’s independ-
ence, most Indo-Africans opted for repatriation to
the Netherlands.
‘Children of nature’
The shortage of manpower in the Dutch colonial
army became particularly acute in the wake of
the Java War (1825-1830), which took the lives of
8,000 European soldiers and many more native
soldiers, and the secession of Belgium in 1830,
which meant that the national reservoir for army
recruitment had shrunk considerably. Various
options were explored to find new sources of
manpower to supply the army in the East Indies,
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Like all colonial armies, the East Indies army
(Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger, known as
KNIL) also recruited native soldiers in the Indone-
sian archipelago. Army policy in the 19th century
dictated, however, that roughly half the troops
had to consist of Europeans, who were deemed
more reliable and better qualified. Reliance on
native troops carried the inherent danger that
some day they would use their training and their
weapons to turn against their colonial masters.
The most favoured native troops were the
Amboinese, as the people from the Moluccan
islands were commonly known. As Christians,
they were considered more loyal to Dutch rule
than the largely Islamic population on Java and
most of Sumatra. The Amboinese were much
better paid than other native troops, had more
opportunities for advancement and were in some
respects placed on equal footing with the Euro-
pean troops.
The African soldiers were to be counted as
part of the European contingent. It was deemed
most unlikely that they would make common
cause with the local population. Dutch officials
were convinced that the inhabitants of Java and
Sumatra would fear the Africans as ‘cannibals’.
On the other hand, the Africans would certainly
look down on Asians, as these were neither
properly black nor properly white.4 It is not quite
clear how the Dutch officials arrived at these
stereotypes, but they evidently saw no risk of
fraternization between Africans and Asians.
Troop reinforcements were urgently needed to
counter local Moslem rebellions on West
Sumatra, led by leaders whose religious fervour
had been fuelled during a pilgrimage to Mecca.
As the Africans held a ‘fetish religion’, the Dutch
saw little danger that they would collude with
Moslem insurgents. Army policy aimed to keep
the Africans at a distance from the local popula-
tion. The Africans were encouraged to be bap-
tized as Christians: Catholicism was seen as the
most suitable cult for people who indulged in
elaborate rituals.
Their conditions of service were mostly the
same as those of Europeans, and considerably
better than those of the indigenous soldiers.
This policy of equal treatment made sense in the
context of diplomatic relations in Europe and
perhaps also in the still largely pre-colonial
societies of the Gold Coast, but it was incongru-
ous with developments in the Netherlands East
Indies. In Europe, the Dutch government had to
defend African recruitment against British
accusations that this operation amounted to a
covert form of slave trading. If the Africans were
paid and treated as Europeans, they were demon-
strably not of slave status. On the Gold Coast, the
balance of power between Europeans and
Africans had not yet shifted decisively in favour
of the Europeans. Racial boundaries were still
relatively fluid. In the East Indies, by contrast,
the mid-19th century marked an episode of
empire building and consolidation of Dutch rule.
With the racial hierarchy of a colonial state
rapidly consolidating in the mid-19th century, the
rules with regard to equal treatment for Europe-
ans and Africans must have seemed incongruous,
and thus were constantly eroded.
In at least one important respect the army did
not succeed in its intention to maintain social
distance between Africans and natives of the East
Indies. Like other KNIL soldiers, the Africans
established a relationship with native women. In
due course, the Indo-African descendants of these
liaisons became part of Indo-European society.
They spoke Dutch as their mother tongue, their
children attended Dutch schools and they held
Dutch nationality. The largest Indo-African
community lived in the garrison town of
Purworedjo in central Java, where in 1859 king
William III allocated them a plot of land. Other
garrison towns such as Semarang and Salatiga
were also home to a number of Indo-African
families. Indo-Africans living outside these main
centres tended to assimilate into Indo-European
or Indonesian society, often becoming oblivious
of their African roots.
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Three phases of recruitment:
a slow start
In 1831 the Department of Colonies instructed
Governor J. Last in Elmina to recruit ‘a company
of 150 Negro soldiers’. If the experiment proved
satisfactory, recruitment would then be organ-
ized on a more sustained basis. Instructions from
The Hague emphasized that recruitment had to
take place ‘without coercion or force’.5 Last
doubted whether volunteers could be found but
sent agents to Axim and Accra, while in Elmina
he invited the king and his council to St George
Castle to outline the new scheme. He advised the
king of Elmina that service in the Dutch army
would offer a unique opportunity for his subjects
‘to abandon their usual loafing, to earn an
income, see the world and secure an old age
pension’. The king promised to cooperate, but
also made it clear that he could not force his
subjects into army service overseas.6
Last’s doubts proved well founded. Three
ships that were sent from Holland in 1831-1832
collected eighteen, nineteen and seven recruits
respectively in Elmina. Among them were the
sons of several well-known Afro-European
families in Elmina and Accra: Jan Nieser, Willem
Nieser, Manus Ulzen, Matthijs Rühle and Willem
van der Puye. Some, such as Jan Nieser, who
belonged to a well-known Eurafrican merchant
family, had previously served with the Elmina
garrison and were now qualified for the rank of
corporal. Manus Ulzen was the great-grandson of
Roelof Ulsen, governor of the West India Com-
pany in Elmina from 1755 to 1757. He had been
enticed into army service with the promise of
immediate promotion to corporal. His knowledge
of Dutch gave him the bargaining power to
obtain a better deal than most others. Some of
the other volunteers were young men who
needed the enlistment premium and their
advance pay to clear debts or to settle fines for
various offences. To make enlistment more
attractive, the Dutch introduced a system of
‘delegated payments’. The recruits, which
included both free men and slaves, could author-
ize the Dutch army to deduct a certain amount
from their salaries, that would then be sent to
their relatives, creditors or masters on the Gold
Coast. This system of delegated pay (‘delegatiën’)
was open to abuse and would become a conten-
tious issue in the next years.
This first batch of 44 African soldiers took
part in a military expedition in southern
Sumatra, where the army was sent to quell an
uprising by Islamic fundamentalists known as
the Padri Wars. Initial reports about their quali-
ties as soldiers were highly favourable. Reports
from Batavia to The Hague stated that the
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Three KNIL soldiers in
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Sumatrans were ‘full of awe and admiration’ for
these black giants, who were reputed to be
somewhat ill-disciplined but very courageous in
battle. However, because of the small number of
men, the costs of the experiment were excessive.
Governor Van den Bosch calculated that the 44
African volunteers had cost the Dutch State the
astronomical amount of 1,232 guilders per head,
while European soldiers were shipped to Batavia
at a cost of 120 guilders per head. He suggested
abandoning the experiment because of these
excessive costs, but once the recruitment opera-
tion was in progress, it was not easily aban-
doned.7 The next frigate with another 68 soldiers
on board arrived only in 1836, but meanwhile the
Dutch government had decided to expand its
recruiting operations.
1837-1841: a massive influx
In September 1836 an official mission, headed by
Major-General Jan Verveer, sailed from the
Netherlands with a vast array of presents for the
king of Ashanti and instructions to arrange for
the enlistment of between 2,000 and 3,000
soldiers. Along the coast volunteers were few and
far between, but the Kingdom of Ashanti, which
since olden days had been on friendly terms with
the Dutch and was a traditional supplier of
slaves, was seen as the key to solving the man-
power problem. Verveer, accompanied by a large
retinue of over 900 men and women, finally
arrived in Kumasi in February 1837. They were
well received and the presents – ranging from
liquor and guns to perfume, silverware, sweets,
crystal, a clock and a camera obscura – were
much appreciated. Asantehene Kwaku Dua I was
particularly pleased with the performance of the
brass band, and later sent some of his own
musicians to Elmina to learn the same repertoire
and to acquire similar outfits. The asantehene
manifested a keen preference for the Hunters’
Chorus from Der Freischutz, which became
known as the asantehene’s Song.
On 18 March 1837 a contract between king
Willem I of the Netherlands and Kwaku Dua I of
Ashanti was duly signed.8 The asantehene would
deliver 1,000 recruits within a year. He received
2,000 guns by way of advance payment, with the
promise of 4,000 more to come. Moreover, the
Dutch obtained permission to open a recruitment
agency in Kumasi that, for the next few years,
would be headed by Jacob Huydecoper, a mulatto
from Elmina. Witnessing the frequent human
sacrifices in Ashanti, the Dutch delegation was
convinced that the asantehene and his court
controlled vast amounts of manpower, some of
which could be made available to the Dutch army.
As recruitment was still supposed to be volun-
tary, slaves offered to the recruiting agent
received an advance payment to purchase their
freedom. Upon arrival in Elmina, they were given
a certificate of manumission as proof of their
legal status as free men.
As part of the deal two young Ashanti
princes, Kwasi Boakye and Kwame Poku – the
son and the nephew of the king – accompanied
Verveer back to The Netherlands, where they
were to receive a Dutch education. Boakye later
continued his studies in Delft and became a
mining engineer. Contrary to the initial plans, he
did not go back to the Gold Coast but went to
work in the Netherlands Indies, where he died in
1904. Kwame Poku did return to Elmina in 1847,
but never made it back to Kumasi. He committed
suicide in St George’s Castle in 1850. The story of
the two Ashanti princes has become justly
renowned with the publication of Arthur Japin’s
novel (Japin 1997; 2001).
Recruitment in Kumasi never met Dutch
expectations. In the first year, the asantehene
delivered only 51 recruits. Huydecopers’s own
efforts at recruiting were somewhat more
successful, but still remained far below target
numbers. Ashanti law prohibited Ashanti citizens
from leaving Ashanti territory, and the supply of
slaves was much smaller than had been antici-
pated. The Ashanti would only sell a few of their
slaves to the recruiting agency when they were
in need of cash. Most recruits were probably
bought from traders who brought new supplies
from slave markets such as Salaga. As the army
records list the place of birth of the recruits, it is
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possible to make a rough estimate of their
origins. Among the places of origin are Dagomba,
Mamprusi, Grushi, Hausa and a very substantial
number of Mossi (Latorre 1977). So a large
number of the Africans in the Dutch army did not
come from present-day Ghana but from present-
day Burkina Faso and other neighbouring coun-
tries. In spite of their disparate ethnic origins,
the recruits soon developed strong bonds of
solidarity. In Africa they were known as Mossi,
Grushi or simply ‘Donko’ (general label for
Africans of slave status who originated from
territories north of Ashanti), but in the East
Indies army the soldiers acquired a new, addi-
tional identity as ‘Africans’. Dutch army records
provide ample evidence of a strong ‘esprit de
African KNIL soldier
on Java by Ernest
Hardouin (ca. 1850).
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corps’ in the African companies of the KNIL:
individual grievances could escalate easily into
collective protests.
Later generations of Indo-Africans tended to
know very little about their African origins. Their
fathers had told them that they were now Dutch,
and that they had to find their place in the East
Indies. While memories of the African past faded
away, the ethnic identification was sometimes
the only element of African identity that was
passed on to the next generation. Thus, Mrs Mes,
now living in the Netherlands, remembers her
grandmother telling her that great-grandfather
was a Mozie who had sailed to Batavia from Port
Elizabeth. Therefore she had concluded that her
family roots originated in Mozambique or South
Africa. She proved her point by singing Boer War
songs in my interviews.9 But her great-grand-
father, who had been given the Dutch name
‘Trappen’, was indeed a Mossi who sailed from
Elmina on the ship Elizabeth. While Oscar van
den Berg, whose grandfather was a ‘Groessie’
(Grushi), firmly believed that the family tree
could be traced to Ethiopia.10 As a 12-year-old
schoolboy in the Javanese town of Solo in the
1930s, he made plans with Indo-African school-
mates and soldiers to form an auxiliary corps
that would go to Africa to help liberate Abyssinia
from Mussolini’s invaders. Abyssinia equalled
Africa, and he identified with the struggle of the
Africans.
In several families, some fragments of infor-
mation were handed down to the next genera-
tions, but without much context. Some descend-
ants had African names, or knew a few places
such as Elmina, Sinjoors (St George) or Ashanti,
but without having any notion that these can be
located in present-day Ghana. A few families did
relate their family history to Ghana, but most
only re-discovered their region of origin when
they started organizing reunions in the Nether-
lands in the 1970s. The Dutch historian Dr Sylvia
de Groot, who at that time was working with
students on a research project on the Africans in
the KNIL, was instrumental in assisting the des-
cendants in uncovering their Ghanaian ‘roots’.
Equally important element in reconstructing the
past was a publication in which the origin of the
wax prints on the West African Coast was linked
to the history of the African soldiers (Kroese 1976).
Between 1837 and 1841, some 1,500 Africans
were recruited in Kumasi. From Kumasi, the
recruits were escorted to Elmina, a journey of ten
to twelve days. Meanwhile, recruitment also
continued in Elmina. All in all, between 1836 and
1842 some 2,100 African soldiers left via Elmina
for the East Indies. In 1840, a group of 50 soldiers
was sent off to Suriname, but this was the only
time recruits went across the Atlantic rather than
across the Indian Ocean (De Groot 1990).
Recruitment was first suspended and then
abandoned altogether in 1841. The British
government had protested that this mode of
recruitment amounted to a covert form of slave
trading. The Dutch, having long lost their naval
superiority, could ill afford to alienate the govern-
ment in London. Several mutinies by African
troops in the East Indies had meanwhile also led
the colonial administration to doubt the wisdom
of the African recruitment scheme. Most mutinies
followed a similar pattern. Infringements on the
promise of equal treatment were almost invari-
ably the cause of discontent and at times violent
protest. Before the arrival of the African soldiers,
the Dutch army in the East Indies had three
categories: Europeans, Natives and Amboinese.
Official instructions stated that the Africans were
to be treated as Europeans in every respect. In
local practice however, various exceptions were
made, sometimes to the benefit of the Africans,
but mostly to their disadvantage.
Once the African recruits began to arrive in
large numbers, problems of communication
became more pressing. The languages of instruc-
tion in the army were Dutch and Malay. Some
among the first batch of Africans, recruited in the
neighbourhood of Dutch settlements on the
Ghanaian coast, had a working knowledge of
Dutch. But the large detachments from the
interior, who had never seen Europeans before,
found it at first difficult to cope. Some battalions
used improvised translations of the army’s penal
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code in Twi or Fanti, written in phonetic script,
others read the rules to the troops monthly in
Dutch and Malay, and again others had no official
instruction.
Not surprisingly, army officers found that the
instruction of Africans took more time and effort
than the instruction of Amboinese recruits. So it
did not make sense to give these newcomers
better treatment than the tried and tested loyal
Amboinese. The process of eroding the promise of
equal treatment in fact began with an economiz-
ing measure affecting the Amboinese troops: in
1835 they were given native sleeping mats rather
than the straw mattresses used by European
soldiers. The army advertised this decision of
course as being in the best interest of the health
of the Amboinese, who were much better off
with sleeping mats and leather cushions. Like the
Europeans, the Amboinese in the army wore
shoes. As this was an important attribute of
European status, they always wore shoes outside
army barracks. But since shoes were most
uncomfortable, they preferred to walk barefoot
inside the barracks. Thus their muddied feet
soiled the straw mattresses. The Africans, also
equipped with shoes, followed the Amboinese
practice. But while the Amboinese accepted their
sleeping mats without protest, the Africans
protested vociferously when in 1838 the bedding
arrangement for the Amboinese was extended to
African troops as well. The measure, of course,
was advertised as being in the best interest of
the Africans, as they ‘were known to be of an un-
cleanly nature, to have a greasy skin, greasy hair
and a peculiarly strong and unpleasant smell’.11
The issue of the sleeping mats was a factor in
several mutinies. In April 1840, the three African
companies of the 4th infantry battalion in the
garrison town of Kedong Kebo (Purworedjo) in
central Java had risen in armed protest against
infringements on the equal treatment clause with
regard to pay, clothing and bedding (sleeping
mats). The grievance with regard to clothing was
that the army no longer issued underpants to
Amboinese and Africans. The discontent on pay
was related to the matter of the delegated
payments to the Gold Coast. The army deducted
81/2 cents a day from their pay. Sometimes the
Africans had authorized this deduction, as the
money was meant for their relatives. But in most
cases, the deductions were meant to pay off the
advance that the army had given for the
manumission payments. After about three years,
a soldier would have paid off his debt (about one
hundred guilders) made to purchase his liberty.
Yet, the deductions had become institutionalized,
without any direct relationship with obligations
incurred on the Gold Coast. Thus, the Africans
received a structurally lower wage than their
European comrades did. The African soldiers in
Kedong Kebo had sworn an oath that they would
go on strike if on the 16 April 1840 they did not
receive pay equal to that of the Europeans.
Shouting rebellious slogans, they disobeyed their
officers and stormed the barracks to get hold of
the guns. As the commander had had prior
warning, the European troops beat off the attack,
dispersed the rebels and followed them in hot
pursuit. They succeeded in apprehending 85
rebels, while three escaped.12
The next year, in June 1841, 37 Africans of the
10th infantry battalion, fully armed, walked out
of the Dutch Van der Capellen fortress on the
West Coast of Sumatra after repeated refusals to
obey orders. A detachment of soldiers was sent
out in pursuit and met the deserters near Fort
Kayoetanam on the way to Padang. Attempts to
persuade the Africans to return to their duties
were futile. When the pursuing party attempted
to take them by force a fight ensued, leaving two
Africans dead and four badly wounded. The
remainder were taken prisoner.13 In both cases,
the mutineers were court-martialed. They got off
relatively lightly. The most severe sentence,
passed in the Kedong Kebo case, was two years in
prison and 25 lashes.
Now the army command had had enough.
Even before the Sumatra mutiny, the commander-
in-chief of the Netherlands East Indies army,
major-general Cochius, had requested the
government in The Hague to scale down African
recruitment or halt the operation altogether:
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vulnerable to diseases than their European
counterparts. Mortality rates among the African
troops were as high as those among the Europe-
ans. As with the Europeans, most Africans died in
hospital rather than on the battlefield. Mortality
during the three-month voyage on the ships was
low, but vast numbers died within a year of their
arrival in the East Indies.
One initial motive behind the African recruit-
ment scheme was the hope that African soldiers
would be less expensive than Europeans because
of the shorter voyage – three months instead of
the five to six months from the Netherlands to
Batavia – and their longer terms of service. High
mortality rates undermined this logic however.
Recruitment expenses, including sizeable ad-
vance payments, had already been made, while
the benefits proved short-lived. However, this
type of cost and benefit calculation apparently
did not figure into subsequent deliberations
about the pros and cons of African recruitment.
1860-1872: a modest operation
After some reconsideration, recruitment was
resumed in the late 1850s but on a much smaller
scale and with more precautions to ensure the
voluntary nature of enlistment. A decisive ele-
ment had been the performance of the Africans
in the third expedition to Bali in 1849. The newly
arrived commander of the East Indies army, Duke
Bernhard van Saxen-Weimar Eisenach, had been
greatly impressed by the courage, loyalty, state of
health, strength and endurance of the Africans in
this expedition. They compared favourably with
the Europeans below the rank of officer, who for
the most part were ‘soldiers with a criminal
record, deserters from the Dutch national army,
drunkards, deserters from the Belgian and the
French army and Germans, most of whom are
rascals and tramps, for whom the service in this
colony is a last refuge’.15 The Dutch government
initially decided against his recommendation to
resume African recruitment, but in the late 1850s
recruitment in Elmina was reopened.
Between 1860 and 1872, another 800 African
soldiers sailed from Elmina to Batavia. They took
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‘Wherever the Negro soldiers served together in a
company, they have banded together in mutiny,
under the pretext that infringements had been
made on the promise of equal treatment.’14 The
general’s complaint is an eloquent testimony to
the bonds of solidarity among the recruits, who
now apparently banded together under their
newly acquired identity as ‘Negroes’ or ‘Africans’.
Cochius believed that the promise of equal treat-
ment had been a serious psychological error,
which had encouraged the ‘childish conceit’ and
‘stupid pride’ of people who had just recently been
liberated from the most abject state of slavery.
The Africans, he stated, had no reason at all to
look down on Javanese and Amboinese. It was
just another proof of their conceit and ignorance.
For The Hague, the Sumatra mutiny was the
final straw. By government decree of 17 Decem-
ber 1841, recruitment at the Guinea Coast was
abandoned. Those soldiers already in the Indies
served the remainder of their contract, but there
would be no new arrivals.
However, after the upheavals in the period of
massive influx (1838-1841), things calmed down.
Reports of incidents were few and far between,
less so than with the Europeans who were a
notorious bunch of ill-disciplined drunkards.
The African soldiers turned out to be no less
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an active part in the decades-long ferocious Atjeh
(Aceh) War. Recruitment ended in 1872 with the
transfer of Elmina and the other remaining Dutch
Possessions on the Guinea Coast to the British.
Arrangements were made for the continuation of
pension payments, while the veterans retained
their right to plots on Java Hill.
However, few demobilized soldiers opted for
repatriation to Africa during this last period.
Most chose to stay on in Java, where they were
welcomed into the now well-established Indo-
African communities. After one more unsuccess-
ful experiment in 1890 with recruitment in
Liberia, the Dutch colonial army finally ceased its
recruiting efforts in Africa. By 1915, there were
no longer any African soldiers in active service
in the East Indies.
The aftermath
Many of the sons and grandsons of the African
soldiers continued to serve in the Netherlands
East Indies Army however, establishing colonial
control over the vast Indonesian archipelago,
fighting the Japanese in the Second World War,
suffering the hardships of prisoner-of-war camps
and ultimately fighting the Indonesian national-
ists until the final transfer of sovereignty to
Indonesia in 1949. Along with vast numbers of
Dutch and Indo-Europeans, most Indo-Africans
were repatriated by ship to the Netherlands.
Here, contact among the group was re-estab-
lished when the generation that grew up in the
East Indies reached the age of retirement. Since
the 1980s, a bi-annual reunion has offered an
occasion for old-timers as well as for the new
generation born in the Netherlands to explore
Indo-African roots, to fill in the gaps in family
histories and of course to enjoy Indonesian
cooking and African music.
The 10th reunion, held in September 2000,
was pleased to welcome a special guest: Profes-
sor Thad Ulzen, the great-great grandson of
Corporal Manus Ulzen, travelled from the United
States to the Netherlands to meet the other
descendants of the African soldiers. The story
came full circle later that same year with a visit
to Ghana and Elmina by Daan Cordus and his
wife Eef Cordus-Klink, both descendants of
African soldiers, and for a long time the driving
force behind the Indo-African reunions in the
Netherlands. Now that contact between the
descendants in Ghana and those in the Nether-
lands had been established, a new initiative was
launched to keep the memory of the story of the
Belanda Hitam alive. The Ulzen family decided to
host a permanent exhibition on the African
soldiers in the East Indies in their family house in
Elmina, which was baptized the Java Museum.
The Java Museum in Elmina, to be opened in
2002, will stand as a fitting monument to the
largely forgotten history of the Black Dutchmen.
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13. Reminiscences of the African community
in Purworejo, Indonesia
of Bagelen, the Dutch colonial administration
built no fewer than 25 fortresses. Dutch power in
the East Indies had been undermined first of all
by the English occupation during the Napoleonic
wars. This period marked the end of the rule by
the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-
indische Compagnie). As the newly established
Kingdom of the Netherlands struggled to assem-
ble a colonial army and to regain control, it was
confronted with a large-scale uprising on the
island of Java. Under the leadership of Prince
Diponegoro, the Javanese staged a guerrilla war,
known as the Java War (1825-1830), against
Dutch troops. The Dutch colonial army suffered
very severe losses. Over 8,000 European soldiers
and many more native soldiers lost their lives. In
1822 the Dutch administration was confronted
with another uprising, the Padri War in Western
Sumatra. This uprising, mounted by Islamic
fundamentalists, was not quelled until 1837.
Meanwhile, the Dutch colonial army lost a
traditionally important reservoir of manpower
after the secession of Belgium in 1831. This crisis
of manpower in the army was solved by recruit-
ing soldiers in West Africa, where the Dutch
possessed a string of forts and castles along the
Guinea Coast, remnants from the days of the
West India Company, which dealt mainly in gold,
ivory and slaves.
The first batches of African recruits were sent
off to West Sumatra, where they took part in the
campaigns against the Padri insurgents. But it
was perhaps no accident that the Dutch colonial
government chose Purworejo as their place of
more permanent settlement. In spite of all the
fortresses built in the area, the region of
Purworejo had become known as a stronghold of
Pangeran Diponegoro Anom, the son of rebel
prince Diponegoro. African veterans were
For almost a century, the central Java town of
Purworejo was home to a community of Africans
from the region of present-day Ghana and their
Indo-African descendants. African army veterans
from the Dutch East Indies army (Koninklijk
Nederlandsch Indisch Leger,  or the KNIL) also
settled in other towns such as Gombong,
Semarang, Salatiga and Ambarawa. But the
garrison town of Purworejo was the only place
where Africans had their own settlement. At first
they lived among the Indonesian people, but as
more and more pensioned African soldiers came
to live here the Resident (the Dutch administra-
tor) thought it advisable to give the Africans a
place of their own.
So a plot of land in the village of Pangenjuru-
tengah was bought from the local peasants and
allocated to the African veterans. This decision
was formalized by  Government Decree no. 25 on
30 August 1859. Until recently, the street names
still indicated the location of the African ‘kampung’
(village): Gang Afrikan I and Gang Afrikan II
(Africa Alley I and II). At present, there are no
more Indo-African descendants living here, while
in Purworejo itself only one descendent of the
African soldiers can still be found. Unfortunately,
the street names in Kampung Afrikan have recent-
ly been changed into Gang Koplak I and II (which
means a place to tie up horses). When I did a new
round of interviews and surveys in Purworejo in
early 2001, 100 per cent of respondents indicated
that they would like to have the street names
changed back to Gang Afrikan. Obviously, the
people of Purworejo harbour no negative memo-
ries of their erstwhile African neighbours.
A strategic town
Purworejo was a strategic town in the early 19th
century. In this region, then known as the district
Endri Kusruri
Salatiga.
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Page 142: The Indo-
African family Land-
Cordus posing in front
of the Land family
house, Purworedjo ca.
1932. Standing second
from the right is Daan
Cordus.
Collection Daan Cordus.
